Forgotten Democratic Legitimacy: “Governing by the Rules” and “Ruling by the
Numbers” by Schmidt, Vivien A.
	  
Forgotten Democratic Legitimacy:  “Governing by the Rules” and “Ruling by the 
Numbers” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vivien A. Schmidt 
Jean Monnet Professor of European Integration 
Director, Center for the Study of Europe  http://www.bu.edu/european/ 
Professor of International Relations, 
Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies 
Professor of Political Science 
Boston University 
154 Bay State Road    
Boston MA 02215  USA 
email:  vschmidt@bu.edu    
homepage: http://blogs.bu.edu/vschmidt/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paper prepared for the meetings of the European Union Studies Association for the panel:  The 
Future of the Euro Part I. This is chapter 5 in The Future of the Euro edited by Mark Blyth and 
Matthias Matthijs,  New York: Oxford University Press (forthcoming 2015) 
 
 
  
	   2	  
INTRODUCTION: ‘GOVERNING BY THE RULES’ AND ‘RULING BY THE NUMBERS’ 
 
During the euro’s sovereign debt crisis, European leaders have become obsessed with rules, 
numbers, and pacts. This has reinforced an approach that began with the Maastricht Treaty in 
1992, which set out numerical targets for inflation, deficits, and debt for member-states adopting 
the Single Currency, was formalized by the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) of 1999, but 
accelerated during the Eurozone crisis beginning in 2010. In quick succession EU leaders signed 
up for the so-called ‘Six-Pack,’ the ‘Two-Pack,’ and the ‘Fiscal Compact,’ each more stringent 
on the nature of the rules, more restrictive with regard to the numbers, and more punitive for 
member-states that failed to meet the requirements. In the absence of any deeper political 
integration that could provide greater democratic representation and control over an ever-
expanding supranational governance, the EU has ended up with ‘governing by the rules’ and 
‘ruling by the numbers’ in the Eurozone.   
 
What has become clear as a result of the crisis of the Euro is that the EU is not just missing an 
economic union and a fiscal union; it is also missing a political union. During the crisis, the EU 
abandoned any pretense to respecting the long-standing ‘democratic settlement’ in which 
Commission, Council, and European Parliament all contributed in their different ways to 
decision-making via the ‘Community Method.’ Instead, Eurozone governance combined 
excessive intergovernmentalism—as EU member-state leaders generated the stability-based rules 
in the European Council while treating the Commission largely as a secretariat—with increased 
supranationalism. While the ECB pressed the member-states to engage in austerity and structural 
reform in a quid pro quo for its own more vigorous monetary interventions, the Commission 
gained enhanced budgetary oversight powers to apply the restrictive numerical targets. In all of 
this, moreover, the European Parliament was largely sidelined.   
 
The resulting rules-based, numbers-focused governing of the Eurozone has not only generated 
problems for the European economy; it has also cast doubts on the European Union’s democratic 
legitimacy and its social solidarity. Prior to the Euro Crisis, the debate remained open as to 
whether the EU suffered from a democratic deficit,1 while many touted the success of the 
European ‘Social Model.’2 No more, though diagnoses differ as to the reasons for the deficit and 
the failure of solidarity. Some fault the deleterious consequences of EU policies of austerity and 
‘structural reform,’ in particular for the political economies of peripheral member-states.3 Others 
decry the lack of citizen political engagement in, let alone impact on, EU decision-making, and 
worry about the concomitant rise in citizen disaffection accompanied by growing political 
volatility.4 Yet others blame the poor quality of EU policy processes, with the increase in 
supranational and intergovernmental rule to the detriment of the ‘Community Method’ and any 
significant involvement of the European Parliament (EP).5  
 
These concerns about the impact of the Eurozone crisis on the legitimacy of EU policies, 
processes, and politics readily translate into concepts used by political analysts who explain the 
EU’s democratic legitimacy in systems terms.6 Questions about the legitimacy of Eurozone 
responses include those raised about the output performance of EU policies, the EU’s input 
responsiveness to citizen politics, and the throughput quality of EU governance processes. The 
first two such legitimizing mechanisms are often seen to involve a trade-off in which more of the 
one can make up for less of the other;7 there is no such trade-off for the third.  
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Output legitimacy describes acceptance of the coercive powers of political authorities governing 
‘for the people’ so long as their exercise is seen to serve the common good of the polity and is 
constrained by the norms of the community. Input legitimacy represents the exercise of 
collective self-governing ‘by the people’ so as to ensure political authorities’ responsiveness to 
peoples’ preferences, as shaped through political debate in a common public space and political 
competition in political institutions that ensure officials’ accountability via general elections.8 
Another way of conceiving of this distinction is as the difference between political authorities 
engaged in ‘responsible’ as opposed to ‘responsive’ governing.9 Either way, the interrelationship 
between the two legitimizing mechanisms can involve a trade-off whereby more output 
performance through effective policy outcomes can make up for less input responsiveness, i.e. 
less government attention to citizens’ immediate concerns, as expressed in public debates and 
elections, or vice-versa. 
 
Throughput legitimacy sits between the input and the output, in the ‘black box’ of governance.10 
It is dependent upon the quality of the policymaking processes, including the efficacy of the 
decision-making, the accountability of those engaged in making the decisions, the transparency 
of the information, and the processes’ inclusiveness and openness to consultation with the 
interest groups of ‘civil society.’11 The quality of the governance processes, and not just the 
effectiveness of the outcomes or the responsiveness to citizen demands and expectations, has 
long been among the central ways in which EU institutional players have sought to counter 
claims about the poverty of the EU’s input legitimacy and to reinforce claims to its output 
legitimacy. In so doing, they have operated under the assumption that good throughput may 
operate as a kind of ‘cordon sanitaire’ for the EU, ensuring the legitimacy of EU level output 
and attention to input. But what they fail to recognize is that throughput quality does not involve 
the same kind of trade off as between output and input. Whereas little citizen input may be offset 
by effective policy output, and a lot of citizen input can legitimate a policy even if it is 
ineffective, better quality throughput does not make up for either bad output or minimal input—
however efficacious the rules, accountable the actors, or transparent, open, and accessible the 
process. But bad throughput—consisting of oppressive, incompetent, corrupt, or biased 
governance practices—is likely to undermine public perceptions of the legitimacy of EU 
governance, and it can even throw input and output into question by seeming to skew 
representative politics or taint policy solutions.12  
 
Prior to the Eurozone’s sovereign debt crisis, the EU seemed to do comparatively well in terms 
of Eurozone governance legitimacy. Because the EU seemed to have effective output and quality 
throughput, the minimal political input by citizens did not appear unduly problematic. But with 
the onset of the sovereign debt crisis in 2009/2010, all of this changed.13 Output legitimacy 
plummeted as policies pushing austerity and structural reform led to recession rather than 
growth. Input legitimacy has been at risk as citizens have become increasingly disaffected from 
the EU, if not euro-skeptic, as well as from their national governments as they perceive that 
policies made at the EU level cannot be changed via national politics. And throughput legitimacy 
has been compromised by the inefficacy of rescue plans that were too long delayed and only 
slowly operationalized as well as by the fact that EU institutional actors seemed more focused on 
reinforcing the restrictive throughput rules and numbers than on producing better policy output 
or increasing their responsiveness to citizen input.  
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Only relatively recently has the EU responded in any significant way to the bad output results 
and the worsening input politics—by reinterpreting the throughput rules. But although such 
reinterpretations may indeed ameliorate the situation, they at the same time engender a further 
problem of legitimacy. In a system in which the obsession with ‘governing by the rules and 
ruling by the numbers’ has created an increasingly rigid system of packs, pacts, and compacts, 
any exercise in political or administrative discretion demands rules for stretching or breaking the 
rules—or at the very least agreement on who has the authority to make or break those rules.14 
This may help explain why Eurozone institutional actors lately have tended to engage in a 
discourse that denies that they are actually altering the rules even though they are.  
 
But why, one might ask, do EU institutional actors not then just change the rules? The obstacles 
come not only from the continuing divergence in policy preferences, in particular between core 
and periphery countries, or from differing philosophical ideas about how to govern the economy, 
which pits neo-Keynesians against neo-liberals and ordo-liberals. The obstacles also come from 
the constitutional and legal dimensions of the EU that make changing the (throughput) rules 
extremely difficult, not to mention building a fuller political union in response to the failures of 
input responsive politics and output policy performance. Even were member-states’ leaders to be 
in greater agreement, the rules by which the EU governs the economy are extremely difficult to 
change formally, once agreed. Unanimity rules for treaties makes coordinating agreement on 
what to do, let alone how to do it, very difficult, while changing the rules, once agreed, is even 
more difficult as a result of the EU’s ‘joint decision trap.’15 
 
Finally, moving toward any deeper form of economic integration or greater political union has 
significant implications not only for economic arenas in which the member-states have 
heretofore retained national sovereignty—such as in fiscal policy, as discussed by Erik Jones in 
his chapter—but also for political arenas central to the functioning of national democracy. Any 
further reinforcement of EU level oversight over national macroeconomic policies or budgets, 
whatever the necessity or appropriateness in light of the Eurozone crisis, reduces even further not 
only national governmental and parliamentary responsibility for these central policy functions 
but also their potential responsiveness to the concerns and demands of their national 
constituencies.  
 
THE OUTPUT LEGITIMACY OF EURO CRISIS POLICIES  
 
Output legitimacy is a performance criterion focused on policy effectiveness. During the 
Eurozone crisis, by most economic measures, EU institutional actors failed the test of output 
legitimacy. Although there have been institutional innovations, these have come very slowly, and 
have done the minimal, with more focus on instilling discipline than on solving the crisis once 
and for all. As a result, the economic crisis has gone on and on, while unemployment, poverty, 
and inequality have been on the rise. 
 
Euro-Crisis Policy Content and Rationale 
EU institutional actors’ main responses to the euro crisis involved setting up loan guarantee 
mechanisms to shield countries under pressure from the markets, underpinned by 
intergovernmental agreements (inside or outside the treaties) plus legislative acts that served to 
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reinforce the governance rules first set by the Maastricht Treaty and the SGP. Although many 
policy solutions to the crisis were proposed—e.g., Eurobonds to mutualize debt, a ‘European 
Debt Agency’ to issue bonds for countries in trouble, a European Monetary Fund to rescue 
countries in trouble—Eurozone governments did the minimum. They agreed to the Greek loan 
bailout and a temporary loan guarantee fund, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), 
for countries in danger of contagion from the crisis in May 2010; a more permanent European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM), first discussed in 2010, which came into operation in 2013; and a 
half-baked Banking Union, set up during 2013.  
 
In exchange for the minimal ‘economic solidarity’ embodied by these rescue mechanisms came 
ever more stringent rules and restrictive numbers for all member-states. First came an 
intergovernmental agreement that established the ‘European Semester,’ a framework through 
which to coordinate member-state budgetary and economic policies, which gave the Commission 
increasing oversight and sanctioning powers. The first major legislative act was the Six-Pack, 
which provided stronger fiscal and economic surveillance under a new ‘Macroeconomic 
Imbalance Procedure’ (MIP) for all 28 member-states. It more clearly specified how to quantify 
and operationalize the debt criterion in the ‘Excessive Debt Procedure’ (EDT) at the same time 
that it instituted a kind of reverse qualified majority voting (RQMV), whereby a Commission 
decision would be considered adopted unless it was overturned by a qualified majority of the 
Council. The ‘Fiscal Compact’ which followed was an intergovernmental agreement that 
mandated even stricter budgetary discipline, with member-state signatories expected to enshrine 
balanced budget rules in national law, preferably constitutional (sometimes called the ‘Golden 
Rule’), to be monitored not only by EU institutions but also ‘at the national level by independent 
institutions.’ The subsequent legislative Two-Pack specified further the modalities of 
surveillance of national governments’ budgets by the Commission, along with a timetable that 
amended that of the European Semester. Moreover, for countries experiencing or threatened with 
financial difficulties, the Commission would engage in enhanced and on-going surveillance.  
 
The principles underlying these agreements were largely based on the ‘Brussels-Frankfurt 
consensus,’ which has three basic tenets for Eurozone economic policy: stable money, to be 
guaranteed by the ECB’s role in fighting inflation and ensuring price stability; sound finances, to 
be assured by the member-states, which were to eschew ‘excessive’ deficits and debt; and 
efficient local labor markets, to be carried out by the member-states, with each country 
responsible for making its own labor markets and welfare state ‘competitive’ in whichever way it 
could.16 This consensus combines an ordo-liberal philosophy focused on the need to impose 
austerity in order to ensure stable money and sound finance via rules-based governance with a 
neo-liberal philosophy focused on ‘structural reform’ of labor markets and welfare states as the 
answer to problems of growth.17  
 
EU institutional actors’ rationale for instituting the increasingly strict rules-based governance 
followed from their interpretation of the crisis from the very beginning as a failure to follow the 
rules of the SGP, which had consecrated the Brussels-Frankfurt consensus on Eurozone 
economic policy.18 Seemingly forgotten were the real reasons for the crisis detailed in this 
volume’s contributions, including the massive overstretch of the banks and the accumulation of 
private debt by households; ECB inflation-targeting, which produced increasing divergence 
rather than convergence; the weakness of euro-governance institutions that failed to recognize, 
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let alone warn, member-states of the dangers of over-heating real estate markets or to exercise 
sufficient oversight not just over national finances but also over international banks.  
 
It was as if EU institutional actors had caught a major case of collective amnesia in 2009 and 
2010,19 as they painted the crisis as caused by public profligacy rather than of private debt, in 
what Mark Blyth has called “the greatest ‘bait and switch’ in history.”20 The narrative that stuck, 
in particular in Germany, was about the profligacy of the ‘lazy Greeks’ versus ‘Germans who 
save,’ which was then generalized to all the countries in trouble.21 The framing of the crisis as 
one of public debt in the periphery fueled resistance to any form of ‘transfer union,’ in which 
Northern Europeans would pay for debts accrued in the South, and closed off remedies such as 
Eurobonds or a European Monetary Fund.22 The reality was of course very different, since 
although Greece had indeed been profligate in terms of its public spending, the private sector 
was the main culprit in all the other countries, whether in terms of over-leveraged banks or 
households. This included some of those hardest hit by the crisis, such as Spain and Ireland, the 
governments of which had been scrupulous before the crisis in maintaining low public deficits 
and reducing their sovereign debt.  
 
Euro-Crisis Policy Performance  
With regard to their output performance, the rules-based austerity policies have appeared at best 
to be ineffective, at worst to have exacerbated the crisis. Most of the economic indicators of 
performance dropped significantly across the Eurozone while unemployment reached record 
highs (12.2 percent in 2013), with many countries much higher (e.g., topping 25 percent in 
Greece and Spain).23 Moreover, social solidarity has been in increasingly short supply, in 
particular because conditionality for program countries has for the most part led to across-the-
board cuts in pensions, health care, and the social safety net. Close to a quarter of the EU 
population was at risk of poverty or social exclusion in 2012, while on average 10 percent of the 
population of the EU was severely materially deprived, with higher numbers in particular in 
Eastern Europe and in Greece.24  
 
A Council of Europe report in late 2013 concluded that austerity programs in response to the 
crisis had undermined human rights in key areas, largely as a result of public social spending 
cuts, and especially in countries under international bailout programs. The report in particular 
condemned increasing homelessness in Southern Europe, Ireland, and the UK; failures to provide 
adequate safeguards to ensure access to the minimum essential levels of food—as governments 
limited food subsidies—and even of water in the case of Ireland. The Troika demanded that 
public spending in these areas in program countries not exceed 6 percent of GDP.25 
 
Critics had warned about the likelihood of such outcomes almost from the very start of the 
Eurozone response to the crisis. First, economic policies focused on financial stability that 
assume all countries can tighten their belts at the same time to become more ‘competitive’ ignore 
the interdependence of surplus and deficit countries and the moving average problem at the heart 
of such efforts.26 Second is the very structure of the Eurozone, as a non-optimal currency area in 
which a monetary policy focused on price stability can only lead to continued divergence rather 
than convergence,27 and which would logically push Southern European member-states into a 
never-ending downward spiral of wage repression accompanied by the suppression of social and 
political democracy if they were left without the ability to devalue or to run deficits.28 Third is 
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what Erik Jones in chapter 3 calls the ‘forgotten financial union,’29 and in particular the 
incompleteness of the risk pool and insurance mechanism that was put in place more by default 
than design to respond to the pressures of global financial markets and the challenges of global 
competition.30  
 
Only as the economic output results continued to deteriorate, with unemployment skyrocketing 
and growth plummeting, did calls for changes in policies come to be voiced. Growth finally 
became a matter of debate among EU leaders beginning in late 2011, when the newly appointed 
technocratic Italian Prime Minister, Mario Monti, started talking about the need to focus on 
growth, and was quickly followed by the campaign discourse of French Socialist presidential 
candidate François Hollande in early 2012. This had the advantage of revealing that the policies 
presented as apolitical technocratic solutions that would produce optimum output performance 
were actually political, and conservative, and that politics therefore also exists at the EU level.31 
But it has been EU politics at the mercy – and the calendar – of national politics. And the 
discourse did nothing to change the ordo- and neoliberal cast of the policies, which were equally 
implemented by Monti and Hollande.  
 
Not until Spring 2013 was there a clear call to action, in particular with the need to address youth 
unemployment. Moreover, a report by the IMF in June most significantly admitted that it had 
made major mistakes in the bailout of Greece, in particular by assuming that severe austerity 
would lead in short order to growth, in light of the failure to restructure Greek debt.32 But 
although by summer 2013 the Commission and EU leaders had all switched to a discourse that 
focused on growth, it remained mostly empty rhetoric. No measures other than a paltry youth 
employment scheme had been voted while EU institutional actors for the most part continued to 
insist that the way to growth was through structural reform. The only new initiatives, moreover, 
continued to focus on reinforcing the rules.  
 
Most notable was a proposal introduced in the ‘Four Presidents’ Report’ of December 2012,33 
and reinforced by a joint letter from French and German leaders in May 2013 calling for 
‘contracts’ signed between member-state and the Commission.34 By December 2013, however, 
the European Council rebuffed Merkel’s continued push for such contracts. Moreover, with the 
arrival of a new Italian Prime Minister Renzi, a more focused discussion of growth returned, 
along with a push for greater flexibility in the application of the rules. Now, in place of the 
earlier arguments for increasing EU level capacity to invest so as to jump start growth, came 
pressure to enable member-states to invest, by easing the rules, both in terms of slowing the pace 
of deficit reduction and of not counting investment in growth-enhancing areas against the deficit.  
As of June 2014, however, nothing had been formally changed, nor was it likely to as Merkel in 
a speech to the Bundestag insisted that there was no need to change the rules since the Stability 
and Growth Pact already contained all the necessary flexibility. But this at least seemed to open 
the way to greater informal reinterpretation of the rules. 
 
EURO CRISIS POLITICS AND INPUT LEGITIMACY 
 
Input legitimacy is a criterion focused on citizens’ political attitudes and engagement. Much like 
output legitimacy during the euro crisis, input legitimacy has deteriorated. As the output 
performance of Eurozone policies has worsened while the hierarchical controls of the EU over 
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national economic governance have tightened, citizens’ attitudes towards both their national 
governments and EU governance have declined dramatically, in lock step with their economies. 
This has been most evident in the increasing turnover of incumbent governments, the rise of new 
parties on the extremes, and a growing loss of trust in the EU as well as in national governments. 
But while citizens tend to see the EU level as the producer of ‘responsible’ output policies, to the 
detriment of ‘responsive’ national level input politics, EU institutional actors nonetheless see 
themselves as having their own EU level sources of input legitimacy along with their trade-offs 
with output legitimacy. But these, too, have come in for increasing criticism as a result of the 
Eurozone crisis.  
 
Euro-Crisis Challenges to EU Input Legitimacy 
Of all the EU level institutional actors, the European Council has claimed for itself the greatest 
input legitimacy during the crisis, and has acted accordingly by increasing its intergovernmental 
decision-making to the detriment of the Community Method, in which the Commission and the 
EP would also have had substantial decision-making input. The argument articulated by Council 
members was that they, as the elected representatives of the citizens, could best represent their 
constituencies in the process of intergovernmental decision-making in the Council. German 
Chancellor Merkel, for example, explicitly commended this new “Union Method” in 2010,35 as 
did French President Sarkozy in 2011, who defined a more democratic Europe as “a Europe in 
which its political leaders decide.”36  
 
But what EU member-state leaders fail to recognize is that leaving the bulk of decision-making 
to the intergovernmentalism of the European Council and EU Summits – however crucial it may 
appear in the heat of the crisis – is actually the least input legitimate of processes. For one, 
indirect input can confer legitimacy only on decisions to which leaders agree for their own 
citizens, not those that they would impose on other member-states’ citizens. But even if it were 
legitimate for member-states to agree to legally binding austerity measures for everyone, 
delegating to their agent (i.e., the Commission) the discretionary authority to implement such 
rules is not similarly legitimate, given the necessarily ad hoc nature of the specific application of 
those rules to any given country.37 For two, the Council is not a representative arena as such. 
Rather, it is more like an international treaty body, in which intergovernmental negotiation gives 
those leaders with the greatest bargaining power (read Germany) an undemocratic advantage in 
the closed door negotiating sessions of the Council, as will be elaborated below.  
 
In contrast, the European Parliament, the most legitimate in theory because directly elected by 
the citizens, suffers in practice from the fact that it remains largely invisible or irrelevant to the 
majority of EU citizens. This has been borne out in the increasingly high rates of abstention over 
time from voting in EP elections (going from a 62% participation rate in 1979 to an all-time low 
in 2009 of 43 percent), in what have long been characterized as ‘second order’ elections in which 
national political concerns have dominated political debate and voting behavior.38 It has also 
been demonstrated in focus group research,39 as well as in Eurobarometer polls over the years.   
 
The EP elections in 2014 did not do much to reverse this trend, but they did stop the erosion in 
participation (the rate was only a half point lower, at 42.54% in 2014) and marginally reduced 
the second-order nature of the election. Although national political concerns continued to 
dominate the vote, the debate was more centered on European issues. Moreover, there was a 
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clear politicization of the election campaign—as EP parties ran their separate candidates for 
Commission President in EU-wide campaigns and held televised debates, even though the results 
were mixed in terms of citizen interest or awareness. While a majority of voters were aware of 
the ‘Spitzenkandidat’ in core European countries like Germany and France, most in the UK were 
not.  
 
The fact that the Council finally did choose the Commission President from among the winning 
candidates—against major opposition from British Prime Minister Cameron and initial resistance 
in other capitals—takes the EU one small step closer to greater input legitimacy, by helping to 
generate left/right political debates that have greater chance of spurring citizen interest, and 
thereby to gradually to politicize the EU.40 The one caveat is in the line of: ‘be careful what you 
wish for.’ The greatest interest in the EP elections came from the political extremes, whose 
voters turned out in much greater numbers than those of mainstream parties, helping to make 
Marine Le Pen’s Front National the party with the largest number of votes in France and Nigel 
Farage’s UKIP the winner in the UK. The question is: How legitimate is a parliament for which 
56.9 percent of the electorate have not voted, and for which, among those voting, close to a third 
went for extremist parties that have little chance in national elections, where citizens see 
themselves as having a stake in the outcome? The elections have left the EP with a thinning 
center hemmed in by extremists of the right and left. As a result, the majority will necessarily be 
made up of a ‘grand coalition’ of center right, center left, and liberals, under the leadership of a 
former Luxembourg Prime Minister who was also one of the longest standing members of the 
European Council. Under these circumstances, the politicization of the EU, which was to give 
citizens a clear choice among parties on the left and right, is lost. And in the end, therefore, such 
elections could politicize only to delegitimize the Commission and the EP.41  
 
But even if input legitimacy is and remains in short supply, so what? A different kind of 
argument, equally significant in the legitimation of Eurozone governance, is that the trade-off 
with output performance, as assured by the EU’s supranational institutions like the ECB or the 
Commission, makes up for any deficiencies in input. As another component of ordo- and neo-
liberal thought suggests, isolating the institutions carrying out the policies from input politics is 
as important for output performance as is instituting the right kinds of policies.42 But this also 
assumes that a certain modicum of input legitimacy is retained for such non-majoritarian 
institutions because they operate in the ‘shadow of politics,’ as the institutional products of 
political actors who have the capacity not only to create them and appoint their officials but also 
to alter them and their decisions if they so choose.43  
 
The problem for the EU is that whereas this may apply to non-majoritarian institutions at the 
national level, it does not as readily to ones at the EU level. Often, such institutions have 
significant autonomy without any significant or at least sufficient democratic control from the 
classic ‘democratic circuit’ of parliamentary oversight.44 Moreover, the decision rules of the EU, 
and in particular the unanimity rule for treaties, make the policies of EU non-majoritarian 
institutions almost impossible to alter once established, given the absence of any kind of political 
government that could force the issue.45  
 
The ECB, as the most independent of central banks, is a case in point. Although the absence of 
even the shadow of input legitimacy can be seen to pose little problem when the ECB remains 
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within its charter-based remit to guide monetary policy, as a trade-off with output legitimacy, it 
can be problematic where the ECB goes beyond that remit. The ECB is on thin ice with regard to 
input legitimacy—or output for that matter—when it pushes more input-legitimate actors like the 
Council to implement policies focused on austerity and structural reform, or to join with the IMF 
and the Commission as part of the ‘Troika’ to impose conditionality on program countries.46 
Most problematic in this regard was the secret letter ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet sent to 
Spanish Prime Minister Zapatero in August 2011—which Zapatero denied receiving at the 
time—in which Trichet essentially ordered the Prime Minister of Spain to decentralize the labor 
markets, break the monopolies of certain professions, and to institute cutbacks ‘whatever the 
circumstances.’ The revelation of the contents of the letter in late fall 2013 unleashed a debate in 
Spain about how much the President of the ECB had overstepped his bounds, whether by 
violating his own mandate to focus solely on Eurozone monetary policy, by interfering with the 
democratic control of elected governments, or in taking over the role of the Commission to make 
radical recommendations even the Commission would not have made.47 
 
The Commission, much like the ECB, does not have any input legitimacy per se. Commission 
officials themselves generally see their legitimacy as coming from their accountability to the 
input legitimate European Parliament, that vets candidates for Commissioner and confirms the 
Commission as ‘fit for purpose,’ but can reject individual candidates and/or impeach the 
Commission as a whole.48 Notably, in the course of the Eurozone crisis, neither source of input 
legitimacy has been central to the Commission’s remit, since the Commission has been granted 
quasi-independent powers and discretionary authority to enforce the various oversight functions 
of the macroeconomic imbalance and excessive deficit procedures and the European Semester. 
Such powers have arguably most affected member-states’ national input legitimacy.  
 
The Commission’s power to vet national budgets before governments submit them to national 
parliaments not only challenges national governments’ sovereignty, by diminishing their 
autonomy with regard to budget development. It also undermines one of the main pillars of 
national parliaments’ representative power—control over national budgets—and thereby 
principles of representative democracy, in which elected governments are responsible to those 
who elected them. The fact that the Commission can also sanction governments that do not mend 
their ways only adds insult to injury. It is therefore not surprising that when Belgium was pressed 
to further cut its budget for 2013 or face sanctions, Belgian Minister (and EU democracy scholar) 
Paul Magnette responded ‘Who is Olli Rehn?’ referring to the Finnish Commissioner for 
Economic and Monetary Affairs. That the Hungarian PM echoed the thought shows that the 
spectrum of concern goes from the left through to the (authoritarian) right.  
 
Euro-Crisis Challenges to National Input Legitimacy 
The ever-increasing sway the Commission has over member-state economic and budgetary 
policies, together with the ever-growing number of Eurozone policies and rules agreed by the 
Council, suggests that the Eurozone Crisis has also significantly affected input legitimacy at the 
national level. Most importantly, as Peter Mair argues, the EU in the midst of the Eurozone crisis 
has actually unsettled the balance between the two main functions of national level political 
parties in their relations with their constituents. The crisis has forced parties to privilege 
responsibility over representation, by enhancing their governing role to the detriment of their 
responsiveness to national electorates.49 This even includes opposition parties that may have 
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campaigned against the very policies that they will be expected to implement when they gain 
office, even against ‘the will of the people.’  
 
Citizens have in consequence been left with the sense that they have little recourse in the face of 
EU-generated policies of which they may disapprove, other than to punish national politicians. 
The fragmented nature of EU ‘democracy,’ in which policies are decided at the EU level but 
politics – at least as regards to voting for governments – remains at the national level has meant 
that citizens tend to hold their national politicians accountable for EU policies.50 The result has 
been the increasing cycling of incumbent governments, as voters have punished their national 
politicians with growing frequency and intensity.51 Such political volatility has become the rule 
not only in Greece, Spain, or Italy but also in the core, with France being a case in point—
President Sarkozy was only the second president in the Fifth Republic not to have won a second 
term. President Hollande has the lowest popularity rating of any president of the Fifth Republic 
(17 percent in the latest poll in late spring 2014). 
 
Increasing Euroskepticism or even anti-European—and not just anti-euro—feeling has been seen 
in all countries. Notably, this has been the case not only in the countries hardest hit by the crisis, 
in Southern and Eastern Europe, but also in those largely unaffected by the crisis economically, 
mainly in Northern Europe, as in the case of the True Finns in the 2011 elections in Finland.52 
Moreover, Euroskepticism has been growing not only on the extremes of the right and the left 
but also in the center. In a May 2012 Eurobarometer survey, among those saying that 
membership of the EU was a bad thing, respondents in the center outdistanced those on the left 
in France, Britain, and the Netherlands, and on both the left and the right in Finland.  
 
Rising citizen disaffection from mainstream parties is also part of this, and can be seen in the 
growing electoral scores of parties not only on the extremes of the right and the left—as in 
Greece where the neo-nazi Golden Dawn polled 7 percent and the far left Syriza 23 percent in 
the June 2012 elections—but even in the center—as in Italy with the Beppe Grillo Five Stars 
phenomenon (with 25 percent of the vote) in the February 2013 election. This in turn makes for 
greater fragility for governments, with governing majorities on a knife’s edge, and greater 
difficulties for winning mainstream parties to form a government, as in the Italian elections of 
February 2013—although Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi’s historical win of 40 percent in 
the EP elections and Grillo’s underperformance relative to his predicted score suggests that Italy, 
at least for the moment, has managed to reverse the trend. But worse yet in terms of the rise of 
extremist parties is the possibility that anti-democratic governments will also emerge, as in 
Hungary. The occasional recourse to technocratic governments, as in the Papademos in Greece 
in 2010 and the Monti government in Italy in 2011-2012, however legitimate they may be with 
regard to the (throughput) constitutionality of such appointments or their potential output results, 
also raises questions of input legitimacy, given that they are not the peoples’ choice. 
 
Meanwhile, all the unions have been able to do has been to agree to concessions while gaining 
nothing in return, as in the Spanish pension agreement and the Irish Croke Park deal, at the same 
time that the most social movements like the Spanish indignados have been able to do is 
mobilize members for protests and demonstrations that have brought them nothing other than, 
sometimes, news coverage.53 Notably, the Council of Europe report in late 2013 condemned 
governments’ side-stepping of regular channels of participation and social dialogue on the 
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pretext of national financial emergency, as well as harsh responses against demonstrators and 
infringements of freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, as well as reductions in media 
freedom, in particular in public outlets, such as the closure of the Greek public broadcaster 
ERT.54 
 
THE THROUGHPUT LEGITIMACY OF EURO CRISIS PROCESSES 
 
The challenges arising from the Eurozone crisis do not only involve issues related to the input 
responsiveness of EU institutional actors or the output performance of EU policies. They also 
relate to questions of ‘throughput’ legitimacy, which is a procedural criterion focused on the 
quality of the governance processes by which EU institutional actors formulate and implement 
the output policies in response to input politics. These processes have become increasingly 
intergovernmental and supranational (or technocratic) in the course of the Eurozone crisis, 
leading Jürgen Habermas to warn against the dangers of ‘executive federalism,’ in which the 
tremendous shift of economic and budgetary power to the EU level has occurred without any 
concomitant increase in citizens’ ‘input.’55 
 
The ECB: From ‘One Size Fits None’ to ‘Whatever It Takes’ 
As a non-majoritarian institution, the ECB’s deliberate insulation from even the shadow of 
(input) politics makes it not only more in need to succeed in its (output) performance but also 
more likely to focus on the (throughput) quality of the rules contained in its mandate. The 
insistence on sticking to the rules came out most clearly in the first ten years of the euro, as the 
first heads of the ECB – first Wim Duisenberg and then Jean-Claude Trichet – incessantly 
repeated that to maintain the bank’s ‘credibility’ for the markets they needed to follow the ECB’s 
mandate of inflation-fighting while maintaining its total independence from the political 
pressures of the member-states. When Mario Draghi was appointed head of the ECB in 2011, he 
reiterated this commitment and the Brussels-Frankfurt mantra in his first press conference, 
insisting: “continuity, credibility and consistency are of the essence in the way we carry out our 
jobs” and resisting any suggestion that the ECB could act as lender of last resort on the grounds 
that: “the real answer is actually to count on the countries’ capacity to reform themselves…first, 
put your public finance in order and, second, undertake structural reforms. In doing so, 
competitiveness is enhanced, thereby fostering growth and job creation.”56  
 
The problem for ECB governance of the euro is that following the throughput rules, at least as 
they were originally interpreted, was not necessarily good for output. Even during the early to 
mid 2000s, it was acknowledged that ECB monetary policy fueled inflation in some countries 
(Ireland) while producing something close to deflation in others (Germany). But more recently, 
the ECB monetary policy has come to be acknowledged – even by the ECB itself – as a ‘one size 
fits none’ system, given that inflation targeting for all member-states, rather than leading to the 
assumed convergence, actually produces increasing divergence in all domains.57 “The Single 
Currency did not play by the rules,” as Erik Jones has put it,58 and the ECB as a result decided to 
move to a more considered view of how to reinterpret the rules in order to produce effective 
output.59  
 
As the Eurozone crisis continued, the ECB incrementally shifted away from strict adherence to 
the rules in its charter—or at least the original interpretation of it. Notably, however, the ECB 
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remained true to the ideas of the Frankfurt-Brussels consensus, and its underlying ordo-liberal 
principles. Thus, even as it seemingly violated the letter of the Maastricht Treaty’s ‘no bail-out 
clause’ by buying member-state debt beginning in May 2010, claiming that this was within the 
bounds of its remit because it was only buying bonds on the secondary markets, it remained with 
the spirit of it, by refusing to do what the Fed and the Bank of England did – act as a real lender 
of last resort (LOLR). This is also when it first began pushing the member-states to remedy the 
problems of the euro’s governance, as well as to get their own houses in order through structural 
reforms. Subsequent unorthodox policy shifts, involving low interest loans to the banks via ‘long 
term refinancing operations’ (or LTROs), in late 2011 and early 2012, all were legitimated by 
suggesting that the output benefits justified ‘unorthodox’ policies (bending the rules).  
 
In July 2012, moreover, as the markets had begun massive attacks against Spanish and Italian 
sovereign debt, Draghi pledged to go what seemed the last mile, stating that the ECB was ready 
to do “whatever it takes to preserve the euro,” adding, after pausing for effect, “And believe me, 
it will be enough.” To back this up the bank established the ‘Outright Monetary Transactions’ 
program (OMT), which promised the potentially unlimited purchase of Eurozone bonds for 
countries unjustifiably under market attack.60 The markets took this as a pledge to act as lender 
of last resort, which it essentially was, with one significant difference from what Central Banks 
ordinarily do—the ECB made clear in September 2013 that it would use the OMT to stop market 
attacks on Spanish and Italian bonds only if the Italian and Spanish governments asked, and to 
agree in exchange for a conditionality program. By insisting on conditionality through structural 
reform, the ECB seemed to be trying to legitimize the break with one set of rules in the treaties 
by reinforcing another. This came largely to the satisfaction of German leaders,61 with the 
exception of the more orthodox Bundesbank. 
 
By this time, only the Bundesbank and its head, Jens Weidmann, plus a large number of German 
economists, were opposed to the ECB’s reinterpretation of the rules on the grounds that they 
violated the charter, and risked long-term inflation. The question of the ECB’s right to institute 
OMT was even taken up by the German Constitutional Court. It pitted Weidmann, who 
vehemently opposed ECB intervention on the grounds that its remit was to control inflation, and 
that only the politicians had the legitimacy to deal with the rest, against the ECB’s executive 
board member Jörg Asmussen, who justified the unorthodox monetary policy measures as a 
response to unusual circumstances, insisting that: “We are in a situation of one size fits none, that 
is why we have extended these non-standard instruments.”62 Significantly, the Constitutional 
Court’s decision, which sided with the Bundesbank’s analysis of the illegality of the ECB’s 
never-instituted OMT program, nonetheless referred the case to the ECJ. Subsequently, however, 
and quite amazingly given its recent stance with regard to the court case, the Bundesbank itself 
reversed its position, with Weidman stating in an interview that, in light of a strong currency and 
the dangers of deflation, the ECB could in fact buy Eurozone member bonds or top-rated private 
sector assets, thereby opening the door to quantitative easing.63 
 
The Council’s Governing by ‘One Size Fits One’ Rules 
By prioritizing intergovernmental decision-making during the Eurozone crisis, EU member-state 
leaders have shifted the institutional balance increasingly toward the intergovernmental to the 
detriment of the joint-decision making process that includes the EP and the Commission. As 
noted above, to some member-state leaders, this posed little input legitimacy problems because 
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they touted the Council as the most legitimate body in the EU. But in so thinking, they fail to 
acknowledge the fact that rather than being in a representative forum, they are in a bargaining 
arena in which one country has outsize power. Although academic scholarship on the Council 
has suggested that even where qualified majority voting occurs, the deliberative mode prevails 
over hard-bargaining because of the focus on consensus,64 the argument here is that in the 
Eurozone crisis, where Germany has held all the cards, even where there is deliberation, it occurs 
in its shadow, such that the Council has ended up with ‘one size fits one’ governing by the rules.  
 
Germany’s ‘power of one’ has manifested itself in a range of ways. First of all, the focus on EU 
economic governance through rules and numbers in successive pacts has largely been due to 
Germany.65 Its insistence on governing not just by legislated rules but by their 
constitutionalization via treaty was evident in such cases as the demand that the EFSF be 
followed by a constitutionalized mechanism with the ESM, and that legislative agreements such 
as the Six-Pack (which could be revised through normal EU legislative procedures), be followed 
by the treaty on the Fiscal Compact (which could not be).66  
 
Secondly, Germany’s power of one has undermined the traditional balance in the ‘power of two’ 
relationship of the Franco-Germany couple. Although the relationship between Germany and 
France went from one of bilateral leadership to a bilateral directoire between 2009 and mid 
2012, as Sergio Fabbrini has noted, it was a directoire dominated by Germany, with Merkel the 
major partner in the ‘Merkozy’ leadership duo.67 This can be seen not only in the content of the 
policies, with the German preference for financial stability having replaced France’s focus on 
solidarity, but also on the processes, as German ideas came to dominate France’s concept of 
‘gouvernement économique’ — with Commission-administered rules replacing the euro-group 
discretion that the French had wanted.68 This was apparent even in Sarkozy’s communicative 
discourse from 2010 to 2012, as he gradually shifted from an emphasis on the importance of 
‘solidarity’ for the bailouts to Merkel’s consistent talk of ‘stability.’69 
 
Thirdly, German leaders, by way of the German Constitutional Court, have largely imposed their 
country’s own rules of input legitimacy on the rest of the EU. Instances include leaders’ frequent 
invocation of the Constitutional Court to delay decisions, most notably with regard to bailing out 
Greece; the German Constitutional Court’s own rulings on democratic oversight of decisions; 
and the Constitutional Court’s hearing on the ECB’s various unorthodox programs to save the 
euro, despite its lack of jurisdiction. The point here is not that member states should do away 
with the national democratic processes they consider necessary to input legitimacy but that this 
can cause serious problems for the efficacy of European decision-making if these kinds of 
national democratic exigencies were to be multiplied across EU member states.70 
 
Finally, Germany has largely imposed its own interests on the rest of the EU.71 These can be 
variously understood as the narrow electoral self-interest of the Chancellor and her governing 
coalition, who calculated that a delay in any agreement would enable them to win a major 
subnational electoral contest (in Nord Rhine-Westphalia) on May 9, 2010; as financial self-
interest with concerns about a ‘transfer union’ and the size of German liability in any bailout; or 
even, more generously, as the German conviction that ‘living by the rules’ was in Europe’s best 
interest  
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To be sure, Germany has also changed its position in response to changing circumstances and 
pressures from fellow member-states and other EU institutional actors as well as from internal 
German political actors, in particular the opposition Social Democrats.72 And naturally, Germany 
was not the only member-state promoting this set of ideas, nor appealing only to its own 
electoral constituencies in so doing. Germany’s main cheerleaders in Council meetings were the 
Finns and the Dutch, but there were also the Slovakians and other CEECs who saw Greece not so 
much as the profligate cousin as the richer one. Among other EU institutional actors, the ECB as 
noted earlier put very strong pressures on the member-states for rules-based solutions, while it is 
no coincidence that the Commission has been a strong supporter as well (see below). In the 
development of many of the rules, moreover, the Council President has been equally important in 
developing a consensus on Eurozone governance by setting up a working group that included the 
main EU institutional leaders in monetary and economic policy. Germany’s power of one, in 
other words, also lies in the political coalitions constructed with it and around it, to push forward 
its agenda. And that agenda has changed marginally over time, as the Council’s discourse shifted 
from an exclusive focus on maintaining stability and strict adherence to the rules to one that 
admitted that by 2012 ‘growth’ was important and, by early summer 2014, that even ‘flexibility’ 
was acceptable, but only insofar as this stayed within the pre-established stability rules. 
 
The EU Commission’s ‘One Size Fits All’  
As befits a bureaucracy, the EU Commission’s democratic legitimacy rests less on its Council 
and EP-derived input legitimacy than on the quality of its throughput processes of governance. In 
the Eurozone crisis, however, the Commission has seemed to eschew the transparency, openness, 
or accessibility that characterizes its general approach to formulation processes to focus 
primarily on its efficacy. The euro crisis has largely turned the Commission into a secretariat 
charged with the technocratic application of rules and numbers. The nature of the rules, 
moreover—consisting of more and more stringent pacts for ‘one size fits all’ fiscal 
consolidation—has straight-jacketed the Commission, limiting its flexibility with regard to 
applying the rules in a manner adapted to changing economic circumstances and the often very 
different needs of the country in question. Ironically, however, it is the Commission itself that 
designed the straight-jacket, since it has been key in drafting the Six-Pack and Two-Pack 
legislation and in preparing the ‘Fiscal Compact.’ Moreover, while these rules essentially tied its 
own hands, it also tied the hands of the Council through the RQMV, and the hands of the 
member-states through the European Semester. In so doing, at the same time that the 
Commission has limited its own room for maneuver, it has massively increased its own rules-
based oversight and enforcement powers.  
 
In the European Semester, for example, the Commission has the responsibility to monitor 
developments in each member state using a scorecard, with in-depth country analyses that would 
enable them to decide whether to place a Eurozone member in a macroeconomic imbalance or 
excessive deficit procedure, with detailed recommendations, mandatory reporting requirements, 
and even monetary sanctions. The way in which this is carried out is problematic not only with 
regard to throughput efficacy, given the rigidity with which the rules are applied, but also with 
regard to other throughput criteria, such as openness or accountability. For example, the 
Commission altered its own rules of ‘collegiality’ with regard to the euro crisis, when 
Commission President Barroso granted autonomy of decision to the Vice-President and 
Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs, Olli Rehn. This has led to a process in which 
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DG ECFIN works out the numbers on its own, largely in secret, makes its decisions and then 
informs the Commission, often sending word out to the other members of the Commission on a 
Monday night for a Wednesday meeting, with little or no explanation of those decisions, no 
possibility to overturn them, and sometimes making them public even before informing the other 
Commissioners, thereby potentially putting them in an embarrassing position vis-à-vis their own 
member-state governments, which might expect to be forewarned.73  
 
Equally importantly, the rigidity with which the Commission has interpreted the rules and 
applied the numbers, in particular with the Troika for member-states under ‘conditionality,’ may 
stem more from its own ideologically driven choice of strict enforcement, and belief in the ordo-
liberal output ideas, than Council control or the influence of Germany. We should not forget that 
already in 2008, with the loan bailout programs for the CEECs, it was the Commission that had 
pushed for the strictest conditionality, against the wishes of the IMF, making this the “European 
rescue of the Washington consensus.”74 Thus, even in 2013, when tacit acknowledgement of the 
failure of fiscal consolidation policies led to agreement to ease the policy on rapid deficit 
reduction, the Commission stuck to a discourse that claimed that it was prior success, not failure, 
which allowed for a more flexible policy. Rehn, for example, claimed that things were getting 
slightly better only because the crisis response offered “a policy mix where building a 
stability culture and pursuing structural reforms supportive of growth and jobs go hand in 
hand.”75 
 
Notably, belief that structural reform produces growth meant not just that the Commission had 
done little to promote such growth in its own initiatives—including violating the Europe 2020 
agenda that sought to create the conditions for growth by promoting employment, improving 
education, and reducing poverty and social exclusion. It also entailed keeping an inflexible 
approach to the remaining rules. Thus, Rehn continued to maintain that countries in trouble 
because of high deficits and debt could not increase their deficits in order to propel growth. Only 
if they had posted a primary surplus could they do so. In the case of Spain, however, the 
Commission agreed to change the calculation of the ‘structural deficit’ as proposed by the 
Spanish government (on the grounds that it underestimated the impact of unemployment) so that 
it would also have a primary surplus, and thereby could escape applying austerity measures for 
yet another year. But although the Commission’s ‘Output Gap Working Group’ agreed to make 
an ad hoc methodology change for Spain because the normal calculation appeared so 
improbable, it did not for others out of ‘concern in some capitals’ about the implications of using 
better estimates—which might ease up the pressures on program countries.76 
 
The most damning criticism of the Commission, however, comes from the IMF, whose recent 
evaluation of the Greek bailout found that “the Commission, with the focus of its reforms more 
on compliance with EU norms than on growth impact, was not able to contribute much to 
identifying growth enhancing structural reforms.”77 The Commission’s single-minded focus on 
the throughput rules may be explained by its assumption that this would serve as a cordon 
sanitaire ensuring the trustworthiness of the processes and, thereby, their legitimacy. The danger, 
however, is that the legitimacy of the EU’s input and output will be questioned if the 
Commission’s implementation of the rules appears oppressive, as it has to the Southern 
European countries, and in particular Greece; biased, because it seems to benefit export-oriented 
Northern European countries; or playing favorites, by treating countries differently, as in 
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recalculating the structural deficit for Spain, but not for other countries in similar circumstances.  
 
The European Parliament’s ‘No Size at All?’ 
If during the euro crisis the ECB started with ‘one size fits none’ rules and the Council continues 
with ‘one size fits one’ governing while the Commission remains ‘one size fits all’ ruling by 
numbers, then the European Parliament must be seen as having ‘no size at all.’ The EP has 
largely been excluded from most decisions on the euro by EU treaties as well as in cases where 
international institutions have been involved—meaning all the loan bailouts and guarantees, with 
governance by the ‘Troika’ of the IMF, EU Commission, and ECB. The EP’s exclusion has 
thereby also precluded in most instances the parliamentary debates that could serve to amend 
and/or legitimize policies negotiated behind closed doors by the Council. Moreover, where the 
EP did have a say, in the Six-Pack and Two-Pack, it largely voted to give the Commission 
exclusive power to apply the rules, denying itself the ability to oversee the Commission’s 
decision even as it limited Commission discretion by specifying numerical targets for 
intervention. Here, the heightened sense of crisis together with the discourse of ‘no alternative’ 
was such that most MEPs voted in favor of austerity and fiscal tightening—indeed, pushed for 
more stringent measures than were on the table.78  
 
Until the EP gains more say over Eurozone decision-making, it will not have any robust input 
into current intergovernmental politics, nor can it affect output policies. Notably, the Council has 
no plans to significantly increase the EP’s role in Eurozone crisis governance. Even in the 
various documents proposing a future ‘blueprint’ for the EU, or in the Four Presidents Report, 
the EP is afforded only a ‘monitoring’ role, to debate perhaps, and to provide ‘accountability,’ 
but little more. The only way in which things may change for the EP is as a result of the election 
of the Commission President via the EP 2014 elections. Ideally, this alternative would help 
rebalance the EU system not only by ensuring the Parliament greater oversight over the 
Commission but also by putting the Commission in the shadow of European politics. For the 
moment, however, the increased input legitimacy of the Commission resulting from the 
designation of the Commission President via EP elections may not do much to improve the 
quality of the throughput processes with regard to governance of the Eurozone.  Much depends 
upon the extent to which the EP is able to play upon differences in the Council, say, to push for 
increased flexibility in Commission oversight of the member-states’ budgets.  But this assumes 
that the grand coalition of major parties in the EP will be able to reach agreement on a coherent 
orientation for the Commission, and that this would prevail even over and against Council 
preferences.  Given the EP’s limited mandate in Eurozone governance, this is unlikely to happen 
very soon. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Considering the challenges to democratic legitimacy during the crisis of the Euro suggests that 
the EU needs ‘output’ policies that are more effective, ‘input’ politics that are more responsive to 
citizens, and ‘throughput’ processes that are more balanced and carried out with greater efficacy 
and accountability. The question for the EU is therefore not only whether it can get the 
economics right – by generating economic growth and social solidarity, not endless austerity and 
destructive structural reform. It is also whether it can get the politics right – by enabling citizens 
greater say over decision-making in ways that serve to rebuild trust while countering the rise of 
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the extremes – and whether it will be able to develop processes that are less intergovernmental 
and technocratic, with less slavish attention to rigid numerical targets. For any of this to happen, 
much depends on how EU institutional actors respond to the continuing crisis, and whether they 
alter the rules and numbers to promote better policy performance as well as to accommodate 
citizen concerns while opening up decision-making processes to EU and national parliamentary 
representation. But what is the likelihood that such progressive changes in policies, politics, and 
processes will come to pass? Is a more balanced political union, in which concerns of all three 
kinds of legitimacy mechanisms are addressed, at all possible? 
 
For the moment, although EU institutional actors have themselves become increasingly aware of 
the legitimacy problems, and have taken small steps toward their amelioration, these are by no 
means enough. As we have seen, the ECB has already moved from its initial ‘one size fits none’ 
rules of inflation targeting to doing ‘whatever it takes’ for policy results in order to ‘save’ the 
euro. In exchange, however, the ECB has demanded greater commitment to austerity and 
structural reform, which may save the euro but only at the expense of peripheral member-state 
economies. The Council has largely followed the ECB’s demands, mainly because the 
bargaining of EU member-state leaders in the European Council has produced a ‘one size fits 
one’ governing mode, in which the most powerful – read Germany and its coalitional allies –
have largely been able to impose their preferences. And yet, even Germany’s position has 
changed, as it went from a focus on stability above all to one that included a discourse concerned 
with growth – even though so far little has actually been done to ensure it—and most recently 
flexibility. As for the European Commission, in response to ECB and Council requests it has 
devised the ‘one size fits all’ numerical targets by which it has zealously enforced member-state 
compliance to the rules. That said, lately it has begun to soften the rules in response to negative 
results. Finally, in all of this, the European Parliament has had almost ‘no size at all,’ with little 
role in Eurozone governance. But the appointment of the winning candidate in the EP elections 
as Commission President may not only confer greater legitimacy – and therefore potential to 
exercise discretion – to the Commission. It will also provide some opening to citizens, even if it 
has initially only increased the presence of Euroskeptics and resulted in a Grand Coalition in the 
EP rather than a more progressive majority.  
 
In the immediate future, therefore, little is likely to change radically, since we cannot expect EU 
institutional actors to reverse financial stability rules and numerical targets that have become 
embedded in their practice as well as touted in their discourse – even in the unlikely event that 
there were to be a shift in the political orientation of the Council following member-state 
elections. But, in a positive take on the future, this does not rule out the incremental 
reinterpretation of the rules and recalculation of the numbers over the medium term by a 
Commission with the legitimacy to exercise greater discretion in its economic governance so as 
to enhance the growth potential of member-states’ political economies. Such incremental change 
would also depend upon whether the decision-making system as a whole had reached a new 
‘democratic settlement’ in which the Commission President was elected via EP elections, the EP 
was brought into Eurozone governance alongside the Council, while the ECB was returned to its 
more limited original responsibility for monetary and banking policy alone. As for the political 
economic ideas embodied in those evolving rules, one can probably not expect a paradigm shift 
back to neo-Keynesian expansionism. As for the political economic ideas embodied in those 
evolving rules, although one cannot expect a paradigm shift back to neo-Keynesian 
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expansionism, we could hope for the emergence of a new set of ideas in which, in place of 
today’s ‘expansionary consolidation’ (Schäuble’s term—Financial Times, June 24, 2010) or, 
more accurately, ‘expansionary contraction,’ given the results of austerity and structural reforms, 
why not a new paradigm of ‘expansionary stability’—or ‘stable expansionism’—in which the 
stability rules are made compatible with growth-enhancing policies? If this were the outcome, 
then the Euro crisis would have done what past crises have been touted to do: after an initial 
period of delayed or failed responses, the EU muddles through to a more positive set of results 
while deepening its own integration. But this is not inevitable, as Craig Parsons and Matthias 
Matthijs make clear in chapter 10 of this volume. It requires leadership from the EU’s 
institutional actors, and vision. And currently, at least, these remain in short supply. 
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